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Abstract
This study estimates the transaction costs entailed in maintaining Farmer 
Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS) in Nepal based on a case study of 
60 irrigation systems in the Kathmandu valley. It analyzes the factors 
influencing transaction costs and compares these costs with the production 
cost in agriculture. The findings show that the main elements in transaction 
costs are time spent watching, waiting, and negotiating over water use. 
Time spent on transactions is relatively low for FMIS, amounting to 5 per 
cent of the total time required for the production of crops. Transaction time 
costs are higher for households cultivating land downstream of a canal 
compared to households cultivating upstream. A comparison of transaction 
time costs in terms of crop seasons shows time costs for winter crops to 
be three times higher than that for summer crops. The total value of output 
per hectare is significantly affected by transaction costs, reliability of the 
irrigation facility, and infrastructure quality. However, free riders pose a 
problem for collective action. Controlling free-riding or deviant behavior 
would therefore improve institutional efficiency and reduce  
ex-post transaction costs. 
Key Words: Transaction cost, Irrigation systems, Agricultural productivity, 
Institutions, Nepal. 
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1. Introduction
Agriculture remains to date the main source of subsistence for a majority of people in the developing countries. In Nepal, it 
contributes about 32 per cent of the GDP, providing employment for more than two thirds of the population of the country 
(NPC, 2007). Improvements in rural incomes are crucially dependent on productivity-enhancing infrastructure, irrigation 
being one of them. Nepal is famous for its farmer managed irrigation systems (FMIS). There are about 16,000 FMIS in Nepal 
which irrigate approximately 714,000 ha of cultivated area or 67 per cent of the total irrigable area of the country (Pradhan, 
2002). For a while, the government of Nepal has considered irrigation development to be the domain of local concerns, which 
led farmers in disparate locations of the country to organize themselves to construct, govern, operate and maintain a large 
number of irrigation systems (Lam, 1998; Shivakoti et al., 2002). 
Irrigation systems have two semi-public good features that have to do with non-exclusivity and rivalry: that is, it is costly to 
exclude potential beneficiaries from using it (which relates to non-exclusivity) while the use of the good, i.e., water, by one 
individual reduces its availability to others (which relates to rivalry). Thus, irrigation systems are characterized as common pool 
resources, and, water allocation and provisioning are two potential problems associated with collective action to manage these 
systems (Ostrom, 1990). The operation and maintenance of an irrigation system requires coordination among many farmers 
and is riddled with free-rider problems. Thus collective action is weakened considerably when each farmer has the incentive to 
use more water but to invest less in the system. These problems often result in poor maintenance as well as conflicts when it 
comes to water allocation (Tang, 1992). 
In the absence of access to irrigation water on an individual basis, the institutional development of collectively managed 
irrigation systems assumes importance. The nature of institutional development, however, has a symbiotic relationship with 
transaction costs. While the efficiency of a system is influenced by the transaction cost, institutional malleability in turn 
determines the degree of transactions costs. No empirical studies to date have however studied transaction costs with regard 
to FMIS in Nepal. It is therefore important to understand how transactions costs influence agricultural productivity on farms in 
Nepal. Our study aims to fill this gap in the literature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the history of FMIS development in Nepal while also locating 
the study in the relevant literature on Transaction Costs. Section 3 details the study area and data collection strategy. In 
Section 4, we analyze our data while concluding with policy implications in Section 5.
2. FMIS: A Review 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Nepal invested heavily in the construction of irrigation canals built with the support of external 
agencies and managed by the government. However, despite sophisticated engineering infrastructure and the presence 
of highly trained staff, the performance of these government-managed irrigation systems was not satisfactory (APROSC, 
1978), leading to both severe deprivation of tail-enders and low productivity (WECS, 1982). Until the 1980s, there was no 
formal recognition of the potential contribution of Farmer Managed Irrigation System (Pradhan, 2002). However, with the 
onset of the basic needs fulfillment program of the government in the 1980s, there was acknowledgement that a high rate of 
agricultural development was not possible without the development of irrigation. But since the government found it difficult to 
develop large infrastructure as a means of achieving the desired rate of agricultural growth, it started in the 1980s to provide 
assistance to FMIS in different parts of the country with support from different donor-driven programs (such as Irrigation Line 
of Credit—ILC, Irrigation Sector Program—ISP, etc.). This helped increase irrigated area (Pradhan, 2002). For this reason, many 
of the FMIS came under the domain of the Irrigation Department for a short period of time. 
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After 1990, the need to devolve responsibility for irrigation water resource management to local user organizations gained 
further importance in Nepal. Encoded in the Water Resource Act of 1992, Water Resource Regulation of 1993, and Irrigation 
Regulation of 1999, was a requirement to register canals even if they had been managed traditionally by farmers. The right 
over the source and the canal was secure only after registration as the Acts established the ownership of water with the state 
The Government of Nepal also adopted a policy of not only transferring irrigation systems to farmers but also of creating a 
strong institution of farmers for the management of irrigation water (NPC, 2007).
Despite all these regulatory provisions, there is evidence to suggest that the institutional development of irrigation systems 
is not progressing well. Even in the Kathmandu Valley, less than 50 per cent of irrigation institutions have been registered 
following the legal provisions (Dulal, 2002). A question therefore arises as to why institutional growth has been so slow. One of 
the factors that influences institutional growth is transaction costs. Against this backdrop, the paper attempts to estimate the 
transaction costs of FMIS in Nepal. The specific objectives of the study are to:
a) assess the major components of transaction costs in FMIS and factors influencing the transaction costs incurred by 
households;
b) assess the relative share of transaction costs in total human cost incurred in the production process and the total 
production costs; 
c) assess the role of transaction costs in influencing institutional development as well as its impact on production.
2.1  Transaction Costs – A Brief Discussion
Transaction costs refer to costs that arise when an individual or a group of individuals exchange ownership rights for economic 
assets and enforce their exclusive rights. It includes the costs of (a) information search; (b) bargaining and negotiation;  
(c) ensuring fulfillment of contract; (d) compensation valuation; and (e) legal expenses for gathering evidence, presenting a 
case, challenging opponents, awarding and collecting damages, etc. (Field et al., 1995).
Transaction costs were emphasized by North (1990), who divided the total costs of production into transformation costs –
the cost of inputs of land, labour and capital involvement in transforming the physical attributes of a good, and transaction 
costs- the cost of defining, protecting and enforcing the property rights to goods. He defined transaction costs as the 
costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and 
enforcing agreements. Institutions lower transaction costs and are the key to the performance of economies. Holloway et 
al., (2000) defined transaction costs as ‘the costs of searching for a partner (or group) with whom to exchange, screening 
potential partners to ascertain their trustworthiness, bargaining with potential partners (and officials) to reach an agreement, 
transferring the products, monitoring the agreement to see that its conditions are fulfilled, and enforcing the exchange 
agreement’.
At the community level, transaction costs of collective action are influenced by the physical characteristics of a resource 
and social capital of the community members (Ostrom, 1994). North (1990) considers social capital to be institutions that 
lower transaction costs and perform better than markets. Social capital generates mutually beneficial collective action 
(Fukuyama,1995; Ostrom 1994; Uphoff and Wijeratne, 2000). A high level of trust and strong civic and social norms lower 
transactions costs of exchange. 
There are four key character and contextual factors associated with transaction costs that are relevant to natural resource 
management: uncertainty, asset specificity, frequency, and care or effort intensity (Williamson, 1991; Fenoaltea, 1984; Birner 
et. al., 2000). The efficient management of common property resources is often challenged by sources of uncertainty that 
results in high levels of transaction costs. Frequency of decision making is another attribute of transaction costs as many 
activities carried out to implement management decisions are frequent ranging from daily to seasonal (Binner et al., 2000). 
While effort intensive transactions are related to production activities, care intensive transactions are characteristics of 
protection activities (Fenoaltea, 1984). 
There are several resource management stages when transactions costs become important (Hanna 1995). These are during the 
description of the resource use context, regulatory design and implementation and enforcement of agreed rules. In the context 
of community based resource management of irrigation water, these costs are incurred in the form of negotiation, monitoring of 
activities related to institutional design, maintenance of the organization and enforcement of rights over the water. 
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We now turn to some of the empirical findings in the literature on transaction costs, which suggests that these costs can be 
quite varied. Mburu et al., (2003) studied landowners’ transaction costs arising from collaborative wildlife management in 
Kenya and recorded that these costs was relatively low. Kuperan et al.’s (1998) study in the Phillippines found that monitoring 
accounted for more than 50 per cent of the total costs of co-management.  Sumalde and Pedroso et al., (2001), in their study 
of a community-based coastal management program in Philippines found that transaction costs accounted for 37 per cent of 
the total costs. The share of transaction cost in the implementation phase was 74per cent. 
There are two studies based in Nepal that are relevant. Adhikari and Lovett’s (2006) study on community forestry in Nepal 
found transaction costs to be a major component of resource management costs. The average poor household incurred Nrs. 
1265 in transaction costs annually while rich households incurred an average of Nrs 2312 per year.  Osanami and Joshi’s 
(2005) study of two irrigation systems within Kathmandu Valley shows the importance of conveyance cost and congestion 
cost for irrigation canal maintenance activity. When conveyance cost is high, all farmers recognize the importance of collective 
works for maintenance of irrigation canal and pay fee regularly. But when upstream farmers are reluctant to cooperate with 
downstream farmers congestion costs become important and farmers pay more in waiting, negotiating and watching the water.
While these studies provide estimates of transaction cost we found that there are no studies analysing transaction costs in 
FMIS. This study is an attempt to fill this gap in literature.
3. Study Area and Methodology 
We took three districts (Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur)1 in the Kathmandu valley for our study because the Valley is 
famous for its agricultural production. The total population of the Kathmandu valley is about 1.7 million of which 60 per cent 
reside within the urban centers while the remaining 40 per cent reside in the countryside (CBS, 2001). Irrigation canals exist 
only in the villages of these districts. The total cultivable area in the three districts is about 12,800 ha, 11,069 ha and 7097 ha 
respectively. The major cereal crops in the valley are paddy, wheat, maize and millet. Potato, oilseeds and vegetables are the 
major cash crops. Among these crops paddy, wheat and potato need irrigation water. Irrigation water is necessarily mostly for 
early paddy (which is paddy planted before the monsoons, i.e., in May), wheat and winter potato2. 
3.1 Data Collection 
When the existing institution is transformed to a new one, changes usually take place in the transaction cost structure as well. 
Co-management has the potential to increase the ex-ante transaction costs while achieving gains from ex-post transactions 
(Kuperan et. al, 1998). 
Nepal is divided into 75 districts which are further divided into Village Development Committees (VDCs) and Municipalities 
for purposes of local government. There are 3914 VDCs and 58 Municipalities including one metropolitan and four sub-
metropolitan cities. The VDCs and municipalities are further sub-divided into smaller units called the wards. There are 9 wards 
in each VDC while the number of wards in a municipality ranges from 10 to 35. The survey for this study was conducted 
during the winter of 2007. As a first step, we listed and categorized all the irrigation systems within the three districts of the 
Kathmandu valley according to the number of Village Development Committees (VDCs) they cover, i.e., large (3 VDC and 
above), medium (2 VDCs) and small (1 VDC). There are altogether 415 systems in the Kathmandu valley among which 51 are 
large, 122 medium and 242 small. Primary data collection involved both system level data as well as household level data 
using questionnaires.3 
We selected twenty systems from each category randomly (see Table 1 for the household selection strategy). In the large 
system, we divided the farmers into three groups—head, middle and tail. Farmers in the medium-sized systems were grouped 
into two--head and tail—while we considered all farmers in the small system as head-end users. The sample included twenty 
canals from each category of irrigation systems (i.e., large, medium and small). The number of households surveyed was 180, 
120 and 60 for the large, medium and small systems respectively.
1 The study is confined only to the Kathmandu valley as field visits were possible only in the Kathmandu Valley due to the civil conflict prevalent during the 
study period 
2 After planting, normal rainfall provides sufficient water to paddy plants. The summer potato which is cultivated just after the harvesting of paddy does not 
need much water since the land is wet during this period. Only winter potato needs irrigation. In some parts of Kathmandu, however, farmers plant paddy 
in May, to enable them to cultivate potato twice after the paddy.
3 The three questionnaires were used to collect data at (a) system level, b) sub-system (Head, Middle and Tail) level, and c) household level. 
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Canal infrastructure was categorized as good, medium and poor depending on the physical condition and leakage situation. 
However, for the purpose of the regression analysis, we reduced these three categories to two (for e.g., Yes_Infr) for availability 
of infrastructure  Thus the variable infrastructure then becomes a dummy variable with value zero for poor quality and value 
one for good and medium quality infrastructure. While the survey collected socio-economic and institutional data, it mainly 
focused on transaction cost information. Those households that incurred less than NRs 150 ex-post transaction cost were 
categorized as Free-riders.4 
3.2 Measuring Different Elements of Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are incurred at both the organization/system and household levels. System level transaction costs occur 
both at the ex-post and ex-ante stage (for organization formation). Meetings, registration and negotiation costs are ex-ante in 
nature as they arise prior to the formation of an organization. Ex-post cost, on the other hand, is the time cost for meetings, 
conflict resolution and communications (Bhattarai, 2007). We also calculated transaction costs at the household level where 
we include the cost for watching, waiting and negotiating cost as post organisation formation cost but incurred during 
irrigation management[see Table 2].
Transaction cost estimation involved a direct monetary measurement as well as an imputed one. The direct measure included 
payments to hired labor for waiting while the imputed costs included contributions in terms of time by members for various 
activities. To measure the imputed cost of time spent by individuals in organizational work, we valued the opportunity cost at 
the average wage rate5. The households in the Kathmandu valley have the option of gaining work outside their farm throughout 
the year. Thus, it is acceptable possible to use the labor wage rate in Kathmandu as a proxy to calculate the opportunity cost 
of time (Mburu, 2003). 
Formation cost is a one-time fixed cost which is calculated on the basis of the time and resources devoted by farmers at 
the time of WUA formation. Hence, we used the lowest bank interest rate for lending (9 per cent) to estimate the annual 
transaction cost of formation. 
We estimated the total annual transaction time by adding the expenses incurred by households at the system level as well 
as at the household level. In order to make these compatible, we divided the system level total annual transaction time by 
the total number of households within the system and added it to the household level transaction time. In order to avoid the 
problem of double counting, we did not add the general meeting time at the system level to the total transaction time since 
this is already accounted for in the household’s transaction cost estimate. We converted every 7 hours into one working day to 
arrive at a day measure for time costs. 
In the following section we provide a brief description of the household characteristics, the physical condition of the canal, 
institutions and government assistance. This is followed by a discussion of the relative importance of transaction days in 
comparison to the total human labor requirement in crop production. 
4. Description of Findings
Agriculture was the pre-dominant occupation for at least one member of every household interviewed The average family size 
was 6, the male-female ratio was near equal and about half the household heads were illiterate (see Table 3). 
4.1 Physical Condition of the Canal and External Support
We found most irrigation systems in this area were constructed by the ancestors of the present users. Only a few (3-4) had 
been constructed using direct bilateral assistance. The source of water for most of the canals was rivers and streams. The 
average irrigated area is the highest in the large systems (at 151 ha) and lowest in the small systems (at 15 ha). The average 
length of the canal was 4.2 km for the large systems and 2.2 km for the small canals. 
4  The choice of Nrs 150 as a Free-riding threshold was arbitrary but the regression results were robust to changes within a range of Nrs 50.
5  For the purpose of estimating the opportunity cost, we used the average wage rate of the peak and slack seasons.
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Taking into consideration various parameters like the use of concrete in the canal, the quality of lining of the canal, leakage 
in the canal, etc., we classified canals into three categories: good, fair and poor. On the basis of this classification, we found 
most of the canals to be in poor condition: that is, either there were leakages in the canals due to absence of proper lining or 
they were not able to consolidate water from the source due to lack of a proper dam structure at the intake point of the canal.  
According to our findings, approximately 63 per cent of the households were using canals with poor infrastructure while only 
5 per cent of the surveyed households were using canals with good infrastructure. The remaining households depended on 
canals with medium quality (or average) infrastructure.
Among the surveyed irrigation systems, 50 per cent had been rehabilitated during the last 30 years. Among these rehabilitated 
systems, about two thirds had received partial support from the government while only 10 per cent had been repaired by the 
user farmers themselves. The remaining systems had been repaired by the users with partial support from the government, the 
NGOs or the INGOs. 
During our survey, we found two types of irrigation systems: those with formal registration and those without formal 
registration. Most of the registered institutions had been formed after 1990 while the motivating factor to organize and to 
register the institution in most cases appeared to be the possibility of receiving external assistance to repair the canal. The per 
centage of households having registered WUAs was highest among the large systems category compared to medium and small 
system (see Figure 1). 
Although WUAs registered with government agencies had a higher likelihood of receiving financial assistance for maintenance 
purposes (the correlation between Support and registered WUAs was 0.7, which was significant at .01 per cent), 61 per cent 
of the systems had not managed to register their WUA and a similar number of WUAs did not receive support.  Only 26 per 
cent of the households that were with a registered WUA failed to receive any support (see Figure 2).
Transaction Cost, as discussed previously, refers to the time and money spent by farmers related to the formation and 
continuation of WUA. Farmers incur post-formation expenses in terms of time put into supervision of irrigation facilities and 
ensuring that water flows to their fields. This is borne out by the significant differences in ex-ante transaction costs per hectare 
that farmers spent in forming the WUA (see Table 4). 
Those who received external support also had good or medium infrastructure. Those who had a high ex-ante transaction 
cost also had a high ex-post transaction cost but, not surprisingly, they also had a higher agricultural output. However, being 
located downstream of the canal does not seem to be correlated with support. Instead, as expected, it is correlated with both 
good (or medium) infrastructure and ex-post transaction cost. One possible explanation for this is that those who are located 
downstream are likely to spend more time and effort in order to ensure that irrigation water reaches their fields. It will do so 
only if the proper infrastructure exists and if the households are ready to commit time to ensure that it does so. Interestingly, 
systems that had registered WUA and good infrastructure also had more reliable irrigation. But if the ex-post transaction cost 
was low (i.e., if farmers exerted themselves less in ensuring the flow of water) or if the farmers were located downstream, they 
had less reliable irrigation (see Table 5). 
With regard to the role played by “support”, there was a significant difference in the ex-post transaction cost between those 
who received support and those who did not, irrespective of the type of system. However, while farmers in small systems 
seemed to have a lower ex-post transaction cost when they received support, those in medium and large systems had a larger 
ex-post transaction cost when they received support (see Table 6). 
Interestingly, while farmers in the large systems had a significantly higher average output (that is, the total value per hectare), 
the output in the small systems was significantly lower than in the middle sized systems (see Table 7). When the farms 
were disaggregated by location, we found that in the case of large systems the tail-end showed a significantly lower output 
compared to the group average. For the rest of the farmers, the location did not seem to make a significant difference in terms 
of average output.
Farmers located in the middle area of large systems reported the highest output per hectare followed by the head-enders. The 
next highest output was reported by the tail-enders in the middle sized systems, who were in turn closely followed by the head-
enders in mid-sized systems. The tail-end farms in both large and middle system reported a higher output than the average 
in the small-sized systems. Hence, we could conclude that farmers are better off (on average) as part of a large and middle 
systems than as part of a small system (see Table 7).
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While approximately one third (31 per cent) of the total surveyed households were members of at least one other organization, 
only 14 per cent households of the total surveyed were members of water user associations (WUAs). Even among the 
registered WUAs, only 24 per cent of households were members of WUAs. Of the tail-end farmers, only 14 per cent were 
members of the WUAs while of all members of WUA, only 34 per cent were tail-end users. 
4.2 Transaction Cost and Production 
We can classify the transaction cost into two broad categories, ex-ante cost and ex-post cost, which can in turn be segregated 
into five broad activities: (i) watching, waiting and negotiating, (ii) meeting, (iii) conflict resolution, (iv) communication, and 
(v) formation cost. Among the above, while the “watching, waiting and negotiating cost” and the “conflict resolution” costs 
are ex-post costs, communication cost and formation cost are ex-ante transaction costs. Meeting costs, on the other hand, 
depending on the nature of the meeting, could be either ex-ante or ex-post. The ex-ante transaction cost on average is 
very low (NRs 6 per year per household) in comparison with the ex-post transaction cost (which is NRs 326 per year per 
household). Of the costs listed above, “watching, waiting and negotiating” constitute approximately 92 per cent of the total 
transaction cost while the time spent in meetings takes up only around 7 per cent of the total transaction cost. The remaining 
amount is taken up by the “conflict resolution, formation and communication costs” (see Figure 3). It is interesting that ex-
post transaction costs are significantly higher for downstream farmers (about Nrs 4000) than the upstream farmers (about Nrs 
2300) (see Table 8).
We did not collect detailed production costs during our survey. However, for purposes of comparison, we used the government 
of Nepal estimates of total human labor requirement for the cultivation of paddy (181 days), wheat (141 days) and potato (235 
days). (Government of Nepal, 2006/2007).
The share of transaction time compared to the total human labor required for the production of crops on average, was 4 per 
cent for upstream and 6 per cent for downstream households. The transaction time for winter crops is three times higher 
than that for summer crops. This is mainly because the summer crop has the benefit of the monsoon rains and thus is less 
dependent on canal water. In contrast, farmers rely on canal water to irrigate the winter crop and thus have to devote more time 
for watching, waiting and negotiating. However, if we compare the transaction cost with the total value of output, it is only about 
one per cent of the total value of output (see Figure 4 and 5). 
There are no other studies on the Transaction Costs in FMIS and hence it is hard to say whether our results are high or low. The 
findings of the present study are however consistent with those of Mburu et al. (2003) who studied collaborative wildlife management 
in Kenya. The findings of our study also reveal that the transaction cost in FMIS is relatively low compared to community forestry 
in Nepal. Adhikari et al. (2006), for instance, found that the annual transaction cost for a household in community forestry ranges 
between 9-14 per cent of the total cost which is much higher than those of this study where it was just 4-6 per cent of the total labor 
cost and just 1 per cent of the total production cost.
In the next section we set up our econometric model in order to test for the significance of factors influencing the total value 
of output (per hectare) and the role played by the transaction cost among other factors.
4.3 Econometric Model and Its Results
The critical factor that determines the productivity of farms in the non-monsoon period is the availability of irrigation water at 
the farm level, which is determined in turn by the existence of canals and their maintenance and operation status. Transaction 
costs influence both the maintenance and operation of irrigation canals (although the actual cost of maintenance is not 
part of the transaction cost). There is high uncertainty in the water flow of irrigation canals and this poses a challenge to 
efficient management, which in turn results in transaction costs. The productivity of land also depends upon the physical 
characteristics of the canal system as well as the location of the cultivated farm vis-à-vis the source of the canal. 
4.3.1  The Model
We set up a regression model to understand the effect of farm locations as well as other variables on value of farm output. 
Since this study focuses on transaction costs, we did not attempt to model a regular production function. We examine the 
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impact on production of factors like social cohesion (reflected in existence of dispute and a dominant caste), farm location, 
infrastructure quality, reliability of irrigation, free-riding, transaction cost, external support. We hypothesise that:
 1. Total value of output per hectare= f ( Dispute, Dominant Caste, Location of field, 
  Reliability of Irrigation, External support, Free Riding, Transaction Cost)
These variables are expected to impact on farm revenues in different ways. The expected direction of their impact is presented 
in Table 9. We anticipate that a dispute in the system would adversely affect revenues. However, if the farmer belongs to a 
dominant caste, it may be possible for him to have better access to water for irrigation. The presence of better infrastructure is 
helpful but we expect this effect to be captured by the reliability of irrigation water -- a better outcome is inevitable with a more 
reliable water supply. In terms of location, we expect those in the tail-end to have a higher transaction cost but the impact on 
production is not certain. If there are free-riders, they would have a higher net revenues as they take advantage of the semi-
public goods nature of irrigation systems without incurring a cost for their use. However, even those who contribute find a 
positive impact on their revenues. If a group of farmers exerts themselves to form an organization, then they are likely to have 
gained support for the maintenance of infrastructure. And if they continue to exert themselves to ensure supply of water, then 
their output would inevitably increase. The transaction cost also contributes positively to an increase in output as these are 
incurred to ensure the reliability of irrigation water in the field.
In order to estimate the impact of the variables that affect the total value of output per hectare, we estimate the linear 
econometric model using the OLS method: 
 2. totval_Ha = b0 + b1 dispute + b2 dom_caste + b3 dumlh + b4 dumlm + b5 dumlt + b6 dummedh +  
  b7 dummt + b8 perl_irrif + b9 free_ride + b10 exposttc_Ha + b11 exantetc_Ha + b12 sqexposttc_Ha
The estimated values of parameters are presented in Table 10.
4.3.2 Regression Results
We find that reliability of irrigation system have a positive impact on the total value of output per hectare, as expected. 
Similarly better quality of irrigation infrastructure has a significant positive impact. Free riders have a higher farm revenue as 
they do not bear any transaction costs towards WUA. This also provides evidence that it pays some farmers to “cheat” when 
they free-ride on the contribution made by the others to provide a public good. This, as the literature suggests, is the classic 
dilemma of the commons. 
Transaction cost contribution to WUA functioning results in a positive impact on production. It is expected that a small 
expense incurred in various activities that ensure the flow of water, would have a multiplier effect on farm output. However, the 
negative coefficient on the squared term for transaction cost indicates that the benefits from greater transaction cost increase 
at a decreasing rate. Beyond a threshold, increased transaction costs alone will not lead to higher production. 
The qualitative variables like tail-end of medium irrigation schemes, “Dispute” and “Dominant caste,” even though not 
individually significant, are jointly significant. The other locational dummies are not significant indicating that when controlled 
for other factors, production is not influenced by location. These results are in conformity with our expectations.
We also calculated robust standard errors but since they were found to have similar values we do not present them here. The 
overall goodness of fit (adjusted-R square) is 0.3033 which is in an acceptable range and the joint test of hypothesis (F-test) is 
also significant. All the signs of the variables confirm to expectations as stated in the Table 9. 
In the last section of this paper we summarise our discussion and recommend a possible set of policy interventions.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study attempted to shed light on transaction costs in the irrigation sector in Kathmandu valley of Nepal. We recorded 
the size and major components of transaction costs in FMIS. Our findings suggest that Transaction costs in FMIS are low in 
comparison to other sectors of the rural economy such as community forestry.
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Did availability of irrigation make a difference ? Even though we surveyed only farmers who were part of irrigation systems, 
unreliable irrigation is a proxy for unirrigated agriculture. Our regression analysis suggests that the difference in average output 
between farmers with and without reliable irrigation was on average about NRs 64,000 per hectare after controlling for various 
institutional and locational factors. In comparison with this, the transaction cost of about Rs 3400 per hectare incurred by the 
farmers is minimal. This justifies farmer behavior in undertaking transaction costs to ensure reliable water supply for irrigation. 
Evidently downstream farmers spent significantly more in ex-post transaction costs than upstream farmers. 
Even though transaction costs are low, they seem to make a positive and significant difference to farm revenues. But, it does 
pay to “cheat” as free riders in the system report higher revenues on average. If there is a way to curb free-riding, it may 
increase production further. If the proportion of free-riders is large, the reliability of irrigation may fall drastically. 
Quality of infrastructure has a significant positive impact on the value of output per hectare. Infrastructure funding, however, 
is dependent on ex-ante transaction efforts to register the WUA and access aid from the government or donor agencies. As 
the results from our study show, transaction activities do not cost much but they do matter for collective action as well as for 
increases in farm output. 
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Tables
Table 1: Selection of System
Systems 
Systems  
Covering 
Village
Total Systems 
within Kathmandu 
Valley
No. of Systems  
Selected  
Randomly
Households  Selected Randomly
Small 1 242 20   60  (3 from each system)
Medium 2 122 20 120  (3 from head and 3 from tail of each system)
Large 3 and above 51 20 180  (3 from head, 3 from middle and 3 from tail-end users)
Total  415 60 360
Table 2: Methods of Estimating Annual Transaction Costs
Transaction Nature of Transactions/  Elements of Transaction Nature of Cost Approach Cost Estimation
Formation of  
Organization
Meetings/dealing with  
stake holders/
Time for meetings Value of time 
Wage rate*time
Interest rate as 
annual cost
Formation of  
Organization
Dealing with government  
offices
Travel cost, registration 
cost, statute  
preparation cost
Monetary expenditure Interest rate as 
annual cost
Ensuring the  
implementation  
of decisions
Meetings/ dealing with agents/ 
communication/conflict  
resolution
Time for meetings Wage rate*time Opportunity cost
Protecting and  
negotiating 
Watching, Waiting and 
Negotiating
Time Wage rate*time Opportunity cost
Table 3: Demographic Features of Households
Household Parameter No of Households Per cent
Head of the Household 
   Male 311 86
Education (Head of HH)
   No Formal Education
   Grade 1-5
   Grade 6-10
   Grade 11-14 passed
   Master Completed
183
46
94
33
2
51
13
26
9
1
Main Occupation (Head of HH)
   Agriculture
   Salaried Employed
   Private Business
   Aged
   Pension
   Wage Worker
   Other
238
47
12
50
5
4
4
66
13
4
14
1
1
1
Member of Any Organization
Member of WUA
111
50
31
14
Total Number of Household  n =360 100
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Table 4: Difference in Ex-ante Transaction Cost (per hectare) with and without Support (T-test with Unequal Variances)
Variables Observations Mean
t-value [ Mean 
(without support) 
–Mean (With  
support)]
Satterth-
waite’s 
Degrees  
of freedom
H0: Ha:
Without support (No) 212 30.70 -2.86 138.526 Diff =0 Diff< 0 ; Pr (T>t) = 0.0024
Diff = 0; Pr (T>t) = 0.0048
Diff >0; Pr (T>t)= 0.9976
With support (Yes) 137 157.37
Combined 349 80.43
Difference -126.67
Table 5: Correlation Matrix (Pairwaise)
support totva~Ha type_org exante~Ha expost~Ha yes_infr downst~m prel_i~f
support 1.0000
totval_Ha -0.0069   1.0000
type_of_org 0.7004*  0.0284   1.0000
exantetc_Ha 0.1868*  0.2872*  0.1637*  1.0000
exposttc_Ha 0.1041*  0.3995*  0.0190   0.6778*  1.0000
yes_infr 0.4391*  0.1215*  0.4890*  0.0347  -0.0072   1.0000
downstream 0.0694   0.0459   0.0457   0.0400   0.1380*  0.1582*  1.0000
prel_irrif 0.0328   0.0821   0.1238* -0.0760  -0.1736*  0.1088* -0.2223*  1.0000
(Significant at 10%, N=349)
Table 6: Difference of Means in Ex-post TC per Ha (t-test with Unequal Variances)
Type of  
the System Support
No  
Support Combined
t-value  
Diff = mean(no) 
- mean(yes) 
Ho: diff = 0
Satterthwaite’s  
degrees of  
freedom  
P-Value Alternate  
Hypothesis
Large 4479 3142 3743 (N=178) -1.3429 106.017 .0911 Ha: diff < 0
Medium 4067 2937 3357 (N=113) -1.5549 90.9057 .0617 Ha: diff < 0
Small 1038 2101 1826 (N=58) 1.4471 48.162 .0772 Ha: diff > 0
Table 7: Difference of Means in TotVal_Ha (t-test) for Different System Types with Unequal Variances
TypeSys 1 TypeSys 2 TypeSys 3 All Systems
TotVal_Ha 2,30,123 1,89,409 1,60,885 2,05,434
N 178 113  58 349
Difference of Means Ha: Diff =< 0 Ha: Diff == 0 Ha: Diff > 0 
Head 2,37,165 1,82,929 1,60,885
Middle 2,73,507 -- --
Tail 1,79,934* 1,96,007 --
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics12
Table 8: Differences in Ex-post Transaction Cost per hectare (with Unequal Variances)
Variables Observations Mean t-value [ Mean 
(Upstream) 
–Mean (Down-
stream)]
Satterth-
waite’s 
Degrees 
of free-
dom
H0: Ha:
upstream 173 2572.6 -2.61 279.009 Diff=0 Diff < 0; Pr(T<t) =0.0048
Diff=0 ; Pr(T>t) = 0.0096
Diff >0; Pr (T>t) = 0.9952
downstream 176 4014.6
Combined 349 3299.8
Difference -1442.0
Table 9: Definitions of and Expected Signs
Factor  
Context
Variable 
Name
Definition of  
Variable
(Type:  
Continuous = C
Dummy = D) 
Expected 
Impact  
on Pro-
ductivity
Reason
Dependent  
Variable
Totval_Ha Total Output  
per hectare in (NRs)
Explanatory 
Variables
Dispute Existence of dispute  
within the system (D)
-ve More dispute within the system the reliability of 
water flow will be low and hence low productivity in 
the land
Dom_caste Dominant caste  
(Bramhin and  
Kshetry) (D)
+ ve Existence of dominant caste may manage the re-
source and facility in their favor and hence positive 
impact on production.
  Dumlh Dummy for large  
head households
+ve Positive impact on output as more irrigation facility 
will be available.
dumlm  Dummy for large  
middle households
+ve Positive impact on output as sufficient irrigation  
facility will be available
dumlt Dummy for large  
tail households
-ve Negative impact on output as less irrigation water 
will be available in the tail end.
dummedh  Dummy for medium  
head households
+ve Positive impact on output as more irrigation facility 
will be available.
dummt Dummy for medium  
tail households
-ve Negative impact on output as less irrigation water 
will be available in the tail end.
yes_infra Infrastructure quality (D)
1 for meduum and good 
infrastructure and 0 for 
poor infrastructure
+ve Positive Impact as better infrastructure improves the 
reliability of irrigation.
prel_irrif Reliability of irrigation 
facility (D)
+ve More reliable the irrigation facility more production 
on the land.
free_ride Free riders (households 
having less than NRs 150 
expost transaction cost)(D)
+ve Free riders have positive impact on output as they 
have more net benefit.
exposttc_Ha Per hectare transaction 
cost incurred after the  
formation of organization 
(C)
+ve More time and effort for the collection of water and 
improvement in the reliability of water availability for 
irrigation in the field more will be the production.
exantetc_Ha Per hectare transaction 
cost during the process 
of formation of organiza-
tion (C)
+ve More time and effort for the institutional  
development for the smooth and regular flow of 
water more will be the output in the field.
sqexpost_
Ha
Square of the expost trans-
action cost per hectare (c)
-ve However, use of increasing amount of transaction 
cost results decreasing rate of output gains.
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Table10: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
totval_Ha 349 2.05e+05 2.53e+05 27600.00 2.81e+06 
Dispute 349 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
dom_caste 349 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00
dumlh 349 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
dumlm 349 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
dumlt 349 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
dummedh 349 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
dummt 349 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
prel_irrif 349 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00
free_ride 349 0.30 0.46 0.00          1.00
exposttc_Ha 349 3299.82 5230.99 0.00 67500.00
exantetc_Ha 349 80.42 331.63 0.00 5864.05
sqexpost_Ha 349 3.82e+07 2.55e+08 0.00 4.56e+09
Table 11:  Regression Results (Dependent Variable:  Totval_Ha)
Explanatory Variables Coefficient t
Dispute -43021.9 -1.57   
dom_caste 30993.39 1.23
Dumlh 6041.323 0.15
Dumlm 30460.02 0.74
Dumlt -18247.74 -0.44   
Dummedh -60721.12 -1.51   
Dummt -18273.09 -0.45
prel_irrif 63939.38** 2.20   
Support -89161.5*** -3.30   
yes_infr 59280.18 ** 2.17   
free_ride 155474.4*** 5.64   
exposttc_Ha 45.41855 ***   9.81   
exantetc_Ha 421.8475*** 4.55   
sqexpost_Ha -.0009478*** -5.82   
_cons -25387.06 -0.62   
** Significant at 5 % level of significance *** Significant at 1 % level of significance
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Figure 2: Households with Registered Organizations and External Support
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Figure 3: Different Category of Transaction Cost (in hours)
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Figure 1: Proportion of Households with Registered Organizations  
(by Type of System)
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Figure 4: Transaction Time, Repair and Maintenance Time and Total Time  
for the Production of Crops per Household
 (in man days)
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Figure 5: Transaction Cost (in NRs) by Season
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